European Private International Law and Third States by Bonomi, Andrea
184 Bonomi: European Private International Law and Third States IPRax 2017, Heft 2
European Private International Law and Third States*
Von Dr. Dr. Univ. Prof. Andrea Bonomi, Lausanne
Articulated in a number of sectorial regulations, the European private inter-
national law system has not always grown in a very systematic way. After years
of swift development towards a more extensive coverage of different civil law areas
and an increased integration of the national systems, the time has probably come
to improve the coordination among the single instruments.
The regulation of third-country relationships is undoubtedly one of those is-
sues that call for a more consistent approach. While the universal application of
choice-of-law rules is a constant feature of all adopted regulations, unjustified dis-
parities persist with respect to jurisdiction and lis pendens. The national rules of
the Member States have been entirely replaced by uniform European rules in cer-
tain areas, whereas they are still very relevant in others. Parallel proceedings pend-
ing in a third country are dealt with under one regulation, but ignored by the
others. And while the recognition and enforcement of third-country judgments is
consistently left to national law, this might seem at odds with the far-reaching
European coverage of jurisdiction and choice-of-law issues.
Hopefully, the Hague Judgments Project will result in a successful convention
in the near future. But the external relations of the EU in the area of private
international law should not depend entirely on the prospects for a Hague instru-
ment. Whether this prospect materializes or not, the EU institutions should take
advantage of the negotiation process in order to elaborate on a coherent set of uni-
lateral European law rules for disputes involving parties of third countries.
I. Introduction
The relationship between the growing European system of
private international law and third countries is not a new subject.
For many years, this issue has been both at the centre of doc-
trinal debate and on the agenda of the European Commission
and of the other EU institutions.
Already in its Lugano opinion of 2006, the ECJ held that the
Brussels I Regulation1 “contains a set of rules forming a unified
system which apply not only to relations between different
Member States [...] but also to relations between a Member State
and a non-member country”2. As this language makes clear, EU
external relations can also be covered by European rules of pri-
vate international law.
To a large extent, this was already the case under the Brussels
Convention and the 2001 Brussels I Regulation, since most ju-
risdictional rules contained in those instruments were already ap-
plicable in disputes involving the parties of third States. Rules on
exclusive jurisdictions have always been applicable, irrespective
of the parties’ domicile3. But this was also true for all other juris-
dictional rules included in those instruments, which – although
subject to the defendant’s domicile in a Member State – also ap-
plied to proceedings initiated by third-country plaintiffs and to
disputes presenting other important contacts with third States.
The Group Josi, Owusu and, more recently, Taser decisions clearly
confirm this4.
The tendency to extend coverage to “extra-European” liti-
gation has been brought forward a step further by the Recast
Regulation5. Although the Commission’s proposal to include
jurisdictional rules of universal application6 was not accepted by
the European Parliament7, both the protective grounds based on
the consumer’s or employee’s domicile, and the provision on
choice-of-court agreements, have been made applicable regard-
less of the parties’ domicile8. Moreover, the regulation has been
completed with rules on lis pendens and related actions applicable
in the relationship to third countries9.
The trend towards a universal application of the European
private international law rules is even more evident in other EU
regulations. Thus, the classical distinction between defendants
domiciled in a Member State and in a third country has been
dropped since the Brussels II Regulation10. While this instru-
ment still refers to the national jurisdictional rules for the pur-
pose of establishing residual jurisdiction11, all of the more recent
instruments include a complete set of jurisdictional grounds that
are also applicable to third-country defendants; these European
rules entirely replace the national jurisdictional rules in force in
the Member States and are therefore self-sufficient and universal
in their scope12.
Universal application is also – following the Rome Conven-
tion – the uncontested principle for European choice-of-law
rules13.
While it is clear that EU regulations are becoming increas-
ingly “universal” in their scope, it is yet to be clarified whether
this European system is bound in the long run to entirely replace
the national PIL systems or whether it will still coexist with
some residual national rules. We will examine this issue with re-
spect to the main areas of international civil procedure, namely
jurisdiction, parallel proceedings, and recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign decisions.
* This paper is based on the presentation the author gave at the conference
“Kodifikation des Internationalen Privatrechts: Deutsche Erfahrungen
und europische Perspektiven dreißig Jahre nach der großen EGBGB-
Reform von 1986 – 35 Jahre IPRax” (Codification of Private Interna-
tional Law: German Experiences and European Perspectives 30 Years
After the Major Amendment of the Introductory Act to the German
Civil Code of 1986 – 35th Anniversary of IPRax) on September 24,
2016, at the University of Cologne. The conference was hosted by
IPRax and the German Council for Private International Law.
1 Regulation No 44/2001.
2 ECJ, Opinion 1/03, [2006] ECR I-1145, No 144. On the consequences
of the Court’s opinion see Pocar (ed.), The External Competence of the
European Union and Private International Law, 2007.
3 See Article 16 of the Brussels Convention and Article 22 of the
Brussels I Regulation.
4 ECJ, case C-412/98, [2000] ECR I-5925; ECJ, case C-281/02, [2005]
ECR I-1383; ECJ, case C-175/15 (not yet published).
5 Regulation No 1215/2012 (hereinafter “Brussels Ia Regulation”).
6 See the Recast Proposal (COM (2010)748/3), notably Article 4(2), 25
and 26.
7 See the European Parliament Resolutions of September 2010,
paras 15–18, and of 23/11/2010, para 35. In this sense already Hess/Pfeif-
fer/Schlosser, Report on the Application of the Brussels I Regulation in
the Member States (hereinafter Heidelberg Report), Study
JLS/C4/2005/3, No. 157. See also Layton, The Brussels I Regulation in
the International Legal Order: Some Reflections on Reflectiveness, in:
Lein (ed.), The Brussels I Review Procedure Uncovered, 2012,
p. 75–81.
8 See Articles 18, 21 and 25 of the Brussels Ia Regulation.
9 Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ia Regulation.
10 Regulation No 1347/2000, then replaced by the Brussels IIa Regulation
No 2201/2003.
11 See Articles 7(1) and 14 of the Brussels IIa Regulation. This is not
changed by the recent Recast Proposal (COM(2016) 411/2).
12 This is true for the Maintenance Regulation (No 4/2009), the Succes-
sion Regulation (No 650/2012), the Matrimonial Property Regulation
(No 2016/1103) and the Registered Partnership Regulation
(No 2016/1104).
13 Article 2 of the Rome Convention; Article 2 of the Rome I Regulation;
Article 3 of the Rome II Regulation; Article 20 of the Succession Regu-
lation; Article 20 of the Matrimonial Property Regulation; Article 20 of
the Registered Partnership Regulation.
IPRax 2017, Heft 2 Bonomi: European Private International Law and Third States 185
II. Jurisdiction
1. Civil and commercial matters
While many of the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels Ia
Regulation are already universal in scope, others are only appli-
cable when the defendant is domiciled in a Member State.
National grounds are therefore still relevant for claims against
third-country defendants14. The question of how jurisdiction
should be regulated when the defendant is domiciled in a third
country is still open15.
a) Relationship with the Hague Judgments Project
As already mentioned, the attempt made by the Commission
in the 2010 Recast Proposal to include in the Regulation juris-
dictional rules applicable to defendants not domiciled in a
Member State failed, because the European Parliament preferred
to give priority to negotiations with third countries, in particular
under the auspices of the Hague Conference.
However, some years later, this approach does not seem
very promising. Certainly, the Hague Judgments Project is again
well under way. However, based on the recommendation of an
Experts’ Group and of a Working Group, the Council of Gen-
eral Affairs and Policy of the Conference, followed by the
Special Commission of June 2016, resolutely opted for the
elaboration of a “simple” convention on recognition and en-
forcement16. In such an instrument, judicial jurisdiction will
only be regulated as a basis for recognition (i.e. as “indirect ju-
risdiction”)17. Admittedly, the work on uniform rules on “di-
rect” jurisdiction is supposed to continue in a future, second
step18. However, if a convention on recognition and enforce-
ment is actually adopted, it seems quite unrealistic to believe
that issues of jurisdiction might successfully be addressed in an
additional instrument. If this prediction comes true, the ques-
tion will have to be tackled again by the European institutions
in a “unilateral” way19.
b) Arguments for universal rules on jurisdiction
The political opportunity to harmonize or unify the jurisdic-
tional rules in the relationship to third countries is open to dis-
cussion. However, there are several important grounds for doing
so.
aa) Elimination of “exorbitant” jurisdictional grounds
A first, undisputable priority should be the elimination of
the exorbitant/unreasonable jurisdictional grounds in the law of
several Member States, which are still available for claims against
defendants of third countries under Article 6(1) of the Brussels Ia
Regulation.
This improvement is crucial to ensure consistency and avoid
discrimination of defendants domiciled in third countries. This
is not simply a technical issue: much to the contrary, the credi-
bility of the entire Brussels scheme is at stake. A system that ac-
cords crucial importance to procedural fairness and to the defen-
dant’s protection can hardly be reconciled with a passive accep-
tance of exorbitant grounds20.
The US jurisdictional approach, that Europeans like to criti-
cize, is – at least in this respect – much more consistent: due pro-
cess and its jurisdictional corollaries (such as minimum contacts
and purposeful availment) are indistinctly applicable to the bene-
fit of US and foreign defendants. The only limited differentiation
is that – for federal law claims brought before a federal court –
US-wide contacts (also called “aggregate contacts”) replace
“state contacts”21. But this distinction between home and over-
seas defendants does not involve matters of principle and can
therefore not be put on the same footing as the availability of
exorbitant grounds.
The denounced inconsistency is even more difficult to ac-
cept since the ECJ has clarified, in its Lugano-opinion, that the
national grounds referred to in Article 4(1) (now 6(1)) are incor-
porated by reference into the Regulation22. That being so, it is
no longer possible to turn a blind eye to national exorbitant
grounds as if they were not a matter of European law.
As is well known, this problem is made even worse by the
existing “asymmetry” in scope between the rules on jurisdic-
tion and those on recognition of the Regulation. Member Sta-
tes’ judgments given against a defendant domiciled in a non-
Member State benefit from the mutual recognition system,
even when they are based on unreasonable jurisdictional bases.
This ensues from the prohibition under the Brussels instru-
ments to review the jurisdiction of the rendering court, com-
bined with the impossibility of applying public policy to the
rules relating to jurisdiction23. Of course, this problem is not
new and has often been denounced24, but no step forward has
been taken in this respect since the entry into force of the
Brussels Convention.
bb) Ensuring equal access to justice
Because of the existing disparities among the national laws,
access to justice is not guaranteed on an equal basis across the in-
14 Article 6(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation.
15 See the study PE 493.024 commissioned to the Swiss Institute of Com-
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(2011–2012), p. 604 et seq.
22 ECJ, Opinion 1/03 (fn. 2), No 148, where the Court states that
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dividual Member States25. This result is hardly compatible with
the European freedoms and other EU basic principles, such as
fair competition and the creation of an area of liberty, security
and justice.
If businesses in Member State A can easily bring proceedings
before the local courts against their third-country counterparties,
taking advantage of extensive (and possibly exorbitant) jurisdic-
tional grounds, they enjoy a competitive advantage over busi-
nesses in Member State B, if this same possibility is not open to
them. Mutatis mutandis, unequal access to courts for individuals
in the different Member States can sometimes result in a hurdle
to the free movement of persons.
Article 6(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, while preventing
discrimination based on nationality, does not guarantee per se a
level playing field to plaintiffs domiciled in different Member
States26. Only uniform jurisdictional grounds can help to achieve
that.
cc) Consistency with other EU regulations
At the present stage of development, regulations of European
private international law follow two different approaches. While
the Brussels Ia and Brussels IIa Regulations still refer, albeit re-
sidually, to national jurisdictional rules, this reference has been
replaced in all of the most recent instruments by uniform rules
of subsidiary jurisdiction27. This discrepancy does not seem to
be justified by objective reasons and should therefore be cor-
rected.
c) The structure of a revised regulation
If we accept, based on the previous arguments, that the rules
of the Brussels Ia Regulation should cover all cases of third-
country disputes, several structural questions remain to be dis-
cussed.
aa) Unification or simple harmonization of the jurisdictional rules
A first question is how far uniformity should go. One first
option consists of simply harmonizing the national rules, by pro-
hibiting the use of a certain number of unreasonable jurisdic-
tional grounds. To that end, the inclusion in the Brussels Ia
Regulation of a “black list” of prohibited grounds would be suf-
ficient; the provision of Article 18 of the 1999 Hague Draft
Convention28 could provide a useful model for a specific Euro-
pean list of prohibited grounds. For the rest, the structure of the
Regulation could remain unaltered. In particular, the distinction
between European and third-country defendants could be main-
tained.
The advantage of this approach is that each Member State
would be able, at least to a certain extent, to keep its own rules
on jurisdiction with their national peculiarities, without being
forced to follow unified rules: this would be more in line with
the subsidiarity principle. At the same time, the observance of a
minimum standard would be ensured. Mutatis mutandis, this sol-
ution would resemble that prevailing in the US, where each
sister State is free to apply its own long-arm statute, subject how-
ever to constitutional due process requirements.
However, on the downside, this approach would not meet
other possible goals of unification. The extension of the courts’
jurisdictional reach would continue to vary from one Member
State to the other, although less dramatically than now, so that
access to justice would continue to depend on diverging national
rules.
This might also have some implications for the recognition
of third-country decisions as well as on lis pendens and related ac-
tions. On one hand, in several national recognition systems, “in-
direct” jurisdiction is measured by the yardstick of direct juris-
diction29, so that different national jurisdictional rules may also
result in broader or narrower recognition bases. On the other
hand, such disparities also impact the rules on lis pendens and re-
lated actions of Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ia Regulation,
as they depend on a “recognition prognosis”30.
For all of these reasons, we believe that the best option
would be full unification. This would entail Member States’
courts only being able to assert jurisdiction on the basis of com-
mon European rules, without relying on the grounds provided
for by national law. This solution also appears to be preferred by
the European institutions: as already mentioned, the Commis-
sion had already come up with a similar scheme in the Recast
Proposal and the same approach has also been followed in all of
the most recent EU regulations.
bb) Opportunity to maintain a distinction between internal and external
situations
Full unification does not necessarily mean that the jurisdic-
tional reach of the Member States’ courts should be exactly the
same for internal and external situations. In fact, in relationships
with third States, the need for avoiding multiple concurrent fora
is less urgent than in purely intra-European situations. Also, the
protection of European citizens and businesses and, more gen-
erally, of European interests, may require easier access to
Member States’ courts when third countries are involved31.
Subject to the elimination of exorbitant grounds, the need
for differentiating internal and external situations is quite widely
accepted. Accordingly, the Recast Proposal included some ad-
ditional grounds for claims against third-country defendants
(Articles 25 and 26). Moreover, all of the most recent regulations
provide for subsidiary grounds, which become applicable essen-
tially in external situations, i.e. when no courts in a Member
State can assert jurisdiction on the ordinary grounds32.
cc) How to distinguish “internal” from “external” situations
If the need for some differentiation is generally accepted, the
next question is how to draw the line between internal and ex-
ternal situations33.
Traditionally, the instruments in the civil and commercial
area have distinguished between defendants domiciled in a
Member State and those domiciled in a third country. This di-
vide is not the most appropriate to distinguish between internal
and external disputes: it goes without saying that, even though
25 Recast Proposal (COM(2010) 748/3), p. 3 and 8; Heidelberg Report
(fn. 7), No 158 et seq.; Fallon/Kruger (fn. 19), p. 18.
26 See also Heidelberg Report (fn. 7), No 159 et seq.
27 See Articles 6 and 7 of the Maintenance Regulation (No 4/2009),
Articles 10 and 11 of the Succession Regulation (No 650/2012),
Articles 10 and 11 of the Matrimonial Property Regulation
(No 2016/1103) and Articles 10 and 11 of the Registered Partnership
Regulation (No 2016/1104).
28 See supra, fn. 20.
29 See infra, fn. 62.
30 See infra, fn. 50.
31 As mentioned already, the US system also provides for some differences
between home and foreign defendants.
32 See supra, fn. 27.
33 On this point, see Pataut, International Jurisdiction and Third States: A
View from the EC in Family Matters, in: Malatesta/Bariatti/Pocar (eds.),
The External Dimension of EC Private International Law in Family and
Succession Matters, 2008, p. 125 et seq.
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the defendant is domiciled inside the EU, the dispute may well
involve third-country interests.
A different (and better) approach has been followed in the
Brussels IIa Regulation and in most of the other EU regulations
of the “second generation”. In all these instruments, the distinc-
tion based on the defendant’s domicile has been dropped and re-
placed by a different mechanism pursuant to which some “resi-
dual” or “subsidiary” grounds become applicable when no court
in a Member State can assert jurisdiction on a first set of “pri-
mary” jurisdictional grounds34.
If this approach is extended to the Brussels Ia Regulation,
the first “primary” jurisdictional ground would obviously still be
the defendant’s domicile in a Member State. Accordingly, the
subsidiary grounds would only be applicable to third-country
defendants. However, the current grounds of special jurisdiction
of Articles 7 and 8 would probably also belong to the first layer
of jurisdictional rules: contrary to the current rules, they would
become available not only against “European” defendants, but
also against third-country defendants.
This means, for instance, that in contractual matters, the sub-
sidiary grounds could only be relied upon if both the defendant’s
domicile and the place of performance under Article 7(1) were
situated in a third country. This approach had been adopted by
the Commission in the Recast Proposal, pursuant to which the
subsidiary grounds of Article 25 and 26 would be applicable only
if no court in a Member State had jurisdiction under the pre-
vious rules.
At the end of the day, the traditional approach, based on the
defendant’s domicile, and the new mechanism, based on sub-
sidiary jurisdiction, produce rather similar results. A difference
between the two methods only arises when the defendant is
domiciled in a third country but a special jurisdictional ground is
satisfied in a Member State.
One could also wonder whether some distinctions should be
made based on the plaintiff’s domicile. In the current system,
third-country plaintiffs are treated as plaintiffs domiciled in a
Member State, subject only to the special rules protecting weak
parties. While this makes sense with respect to defendants domi-
ciled in the EU, a differentiation might appear justified when a
third-country plaintiff sues a third-country defendant35.
d) Specific content of the jurisdictional grounds
Besides the structural issues, the choice of the jurisdictional
grounds to be applied in the relationship with third States also
raises difficult questions.
aa) Extension of the existing jurisdictional grounds
As already mentioned, it is fairly safe to assume that all juris-
dictional grounds provided under the current Brussels Ia Regu-
lation should be made available also against third party defen-
dants. Although these grounds have been developed for internal
disputes, they also appear to be normally acceptable in external
cases36. This was also the approach of the Commission in the
Recast Proposal. It remains to be discussed what “subsidiary”
grounds should be made available when no courts in a Member
State can rely on the existing grounds.
bb) Subsidiary grounds modelled on the recognition basis under a future
Hague Judgments Convention
It goes without saying that – if a Hague Convention on re-
cognition and enforcement is finally adopted – at least all juris-
dictional grounds that will be contemplated in that instrument as
recognition bases should also be made available as rules of direct
jurisdiction under a revised Brussels Ia Regulation. This will
allow the Hague Convention’s potential to be fully exploited,
because judgments given under those jurisdictional premises will
be capable of recognition in all future Contracting States.
However, this does not bring us very far. A brief survey of
the current preliminary draft reveals that most of the bases for
recognition provided therein correspond to jurisdictional rules
that are by now already included in the Brussels Ia Regulation,
subject only to some slight differences37. Accordingly, the recog-
nition ground based on the habitual residence38 closely resembles
general jurisdiction based on the defendant’s domicile39. The
same is also true for other recognition bases, such as those based
on express or tacit consent, on the location of a defendant’s
branch or establishment, on the place of the harmful act or
omission, and on the place of protection of IP rights40.
One of the very few instances where the Hague Draft goes
somewhat further than the Regulation is with reference to judg-
ments in contractual matters. For these disputes, the present text
of Article 5(1)(g) does not refer to the place of performance of
the “characteristic” obligation (as implicitly does Article 7(1)(b)
of the Regulation), but to the place of performance of the dis-
puted obligation, albeit subject to the additional condition that
the defendant’s activities reveal a “purposeful and substantial
connection” to the forum State. This seems to allow a judgment
ordering the debtor to pay the contractual price to be recognised
and enforced in the other future Contracting States of the Hague
Convention, if it was given at the place of payment. In order to
fully exploit this possibility, a forum at the place of payment (and
more generally at the place of performance of the disputed obli-
gation) should be made available in a revised Brussels Ia Regu-
lation for claims under a contract for sale or for the provision of
services. This jurisdictional ground should not replace the place
of performance of the characteristic obligation, but should rather
be added as a subsidiary rule, applicable only in external situ-
ations.
This solution, which mirrors the existing jurisdictional rules
of some Member States, serves European interests well, since
European providers of goods and services would be able to avail
themselves of a forum at the place of payment (often at their
own domicile) even though the goods or services are to be
delivered/provided overseas. Nobody could suggest that such a
jurisdictional ground is unreasonable or exorbitant, since it
was already provided for (in “internal” situations) by the
Brussels Convention and is still available under the Brussels Ia
Regulation for contractual disputes falling under Article 7(1)(a).
cc) Opportunity to provide for further grounds
Further subsidiary grounds might be provided by European
legislation, even though they do not match the bases for recog-
34 See supra, fn. 27.
35 In such “f-cubed” cases, US courts often dismiss the case on forum non
conveniens grounds. This possibility might also be envisaged in Europe.
36 The European Group of Private International Law (EGPIL), in its “Pro-
posed Amendment of Chapter II of Regulation 44/2001 in Order to
Apply to External Situations” (Bergen, 2008, available at the address
http://www.gedip-egpil.eu), envisaged a simple extension of all existing
jurisdictional rules to external situations, with the only addition of a
forum necessitatis.
37 See Bonomi (fn. 16), p. 18 et seq.
38 Article 5(1)(a).
39 In particular, the definition of “habitual residence” for legal persons
under Article 3(2) of the Draft is almost identical to the definition of
“domicile” under Article 63 of the Brussels Ia Regulation.
40 Article 5(1)(d), (e), (f), (j) and (k) of the Draft.
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nition under a future Hague instrument. Although the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments rendered on such grounds
will not be guaranteed by the future instrument, a broader reach
of European courts’ jurisdiction can be considered appropriate
on several grounds.
A first obvious reason is that, even in the absence of recogni-
tion in the concerned third State(s), a decision given in a
Member State will be effective in the forum State, and capable
of being recognised and enforced in all other Member States of
the EU (as well as in the Lugano States). Therefore, the prevai-
ling party will be able to enforce the judgment on assets situated
in the forum or in other EU or EFTA States. It will also be able
to use that judgment as a “shield” against recognition and en-
forcement of an unfavourable third country decision. Also, at an
earlier stage of litigation, the availability of a forum in an EU
State will create the conditions, at least in some cases, for a lis
pendens or forum non conveniens motion to be raised before a third-
country court.
A second reason is that a judgment rendered by a Member
State’s court might be recognised and enforced in a third
country, even though it rests on other jurisdictional premises
than those endorsed by a future Hague Judgment Convention.
On one hand, countries that won’t ratify the future instrument
will continue to apply their national rules on recognition, which
may provide for different, sometimes even broader bases for re-
cognition. On the other hand, national recognition rules will
continue to be relevant even in the Contracting States of a future
Hague Convention: it is almost certain that this instrument will
only set a minimum standard for recognition and enforcement,
thereby allowing Contracting States to maintain more generous
rules based on their national law41.
US law provides a good example. Under the recognition
rules that are presently applicable in most sister States, a foreign
judgment can be recognised and enforced if it satisfies US juris-
dictional standards, i.e. whenever the defendant has established
minimum purposeful connections with the forum State. This
means, for instance, that a judgment in a contractual matter can
be recognised (even though it was not rendered at the place of
performance of the contractual obligation), when the defendant,
for instance, had “reached out” to the other party and/or ac-
cepted to engage in lengthy pre-contractual negotiations within
the forum State42. Such recognition bases, which will not be in-
cluded as such in the future Hague Convention, will nevertheless
continue to be applicable, irrespective of whether the US will
ratify the Convention or not.
This does not mean, obviously, that broad and unpredictable
criteria such as “minimum contacts” or “purposeful availment”
should be included in the Brussels Ia Regulation, but only that
additional jurisdictional grounds other than those that are pre-
sently available against European defendants might well be con-
sidered as subsidiary grounds in third-country relationships.
dd) The subsidiary grounds of the Recast Proposal
Articles 25 and 26 of the Recast Proposal, are an example of
possible subsidiary grounds. Article 26 included a forum necessita-
tis rule, which is now also available on a subsidiary basis in most
other recent EU regulations. This is certainly a very important
provision that ensures access to justice when no other court is
available outside the Member States of the EU, thereby comply-
ing with basic principles of due process43. However, since its ap-
plication is limited to exceptional situations, forum necessitatis
should not be the only subsidiary rule for “external” situations.
Article 25 embodied a rule of “quasi in-rem” jurisdiction,
such as those that exist under several national systems. Its most
significant advantage resides in the fact that it grants jurisdic-
tion to the courts at the place where the debtor’s assets are
situated, so that a judgment can be directly enforced in the
forum State. For money judgments, this takes off the table the
possible problems related to recognition and enforcement in a
third country. To avoid its exorbitant and unwarranted applica-
tion, the Commission suggested that this ground be available
only if (1) the value of the property is not disproportionate to
the value of the claim and (2) the dispute has a sufficient con-
nection with the forum. With such qualifications the rule is
certainly compatible with due process requirements and might
therefore be considered as one of the possible rules of sub-
sidiary jurisdiction. However, other options might also be
considered.
ee) Further subsidiary grounds in contractual matters
In the contractual area, we have already mentioned that sub-
sidiary jurisdiction could be based, for all types of contracts, on
the place of performance of the disputed obligation (i.e. the ob-
ligation “in question”). However, this ground should also co-
exist, again for all contracts, with that at the place of perfor-
mance of the characteristic obligation: the courts at that place
would be able to rule on all obligations arising out of the
contract, irrespective of their place of performance. Compared
with the current provisions of Article 7(1) of the Brussels Ia
Regulation, the dual reference, for all contracts, to the place of
performance of both the disputed and the characteristic obli-
gation would significantly increase the jurisdictional options
available to EU businesses and professionals.
Furthermore, it might be interesting to explore the possibil-
ity of extending some of the solutions currently applied to con-
sumer contracts to (at least certain) business-to-business disputes.
At first sight, the claimant’s domicile rule of Article 18 of the
Brussels Ia Regulation might be deemed inappropriate if applied
to B2B disputes. One should consider, however, that the poten-
tially exorbitant reach of that rule is largely tempered by the “di-
rected-activity” requirement of Article 17(1)(c): a forum at the
consumer’s domicile is available only if the trader “targeted” that
country. To a large extent, this targeting requirement addresses
the same concern that, in the US jurisdictional scheme, is ex-
pressed by the “purposeful availment” paradigm. This means that
a judgment rendered by the courts of a “targeted” EU country
might very well be capable of being recognised and enforced in
the US (and perhaps in other third countries that might share
the US approach).
ff) Further subsidiary grounds for tortious claims
With respect to tortious claims, the extension to external re-
lationships of the locus delicti rule of Article 7(2), as interpreted
by the ECJ on the line of the so-called “ubiquity rule”, would
per se guarantee a very broad reach to Member States courts –
much broader, in fact, than the jurisdiction of their US counter-
parts.
Products liability disputes offer a good example. If a product
manufactured overseas by a third-country corporation causes an
41 See Article 16 of the 2016 Preliminary Draft.
42 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985). See also van Lith,
International Jurisdiction and Commercial Litigation, Uniform Rules
for Contractual Disputes, 2009, p. 278 et seq.
43 See also the Article 24bis of the EGPIL “Proposed Amendment” (supra,
fn. 36).
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accident in Europe, the courts of the place of the harmful event
would undisputedly have jurisdiction under an “extended”
Brussels system44. From a European perspective, this would not
be particularly revolutionary, because several Member States al-
ready have similar rules in their national systems. However, this
is quite different from the present state of the law in the US,
where the courts at the place of the damage can only assert juris-
diction over an out-of-state manufacturer if he created purpose-
ful contacts with the forum State. The simple act of putting
products in the “stream of commerce” is (at least generally) not
sufficient, even though the manufacturer could predict that they
would end up in the forum State45.
The extensive implications of the “ubiquity rule” are tem-
pered by other case-law rules developed by the ECJ with the
clear purpose of preventing an excessive proliferation of available
fora inside the European justice area and ensuring a priority to
the courts’ at the defendant’s domicile. However, such concerns
do not have the same weight when the defendant is domiciled in
a third State, while it becomes more important to guarantee that
the victims of a tort occurring in Europe have effective access to
justice.
It seems, in particular, that the so-called “mosaic approach”,
the effect of which is to limit the jurisdiction of the courts at the
place of the event to local damages only46, is not so pertinent
with respect to third-country disputes. In such cases, the possi-
bility for the tort victim to bring proceedings for the entirety of
the damage suffered in the State of the defendant’s domicile –
often emphasized by the ECJ as a justification for the “mosaic
approach” – is less effective. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the
court situated at the place of damage should extend to the enti-
rety of the damage.
One can also wonder whether the quite restrictive definition
of “damage” adopted by the ECJ47 should perhaps also be recon-
sidered in order to better protect European victims of a harmful
event occurred abroad. Presently, the European victim of an ac-
cident occurring abroad cannot bring a liability claim against the
tortfeasor at the place where she suffered indirect and con-
sequential damages. In third-country disputes, this might perhaps
be corrected, at least in certain situations.
In this respect, particular attention should be paid to human
rights violations. Admittedly, some of the hurdles that potential
plaintiffs currently meet in this area could be overcome through
the mere extension to third-country defendants of some jurisdic-
tional rules already provided by the current Regulation. Thus,
the availability on a European scale of the jurisdictional rule of
Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation would allow victims of
overseas violations to jointly sue before a Member State court a
European corporation and its foreign subsidiaries, thereby filling
a gap that results from the absence of an equivalent rule in the
national systems of several Member States. Also, when the act or
the event is located in Europe, the erga omnes application of the
locus delicti rule would make it easier to initiate proceedings
against third-country defendants. Furthermore, a forum necessitatis
rule would be particularly helpful when proceedings are imposs-
ible, or cannot reasonably be brought or conducted in the third
State (or States) that are more directly concerned. However, all
these improvements might sometimes be insufficient. While the
admission of a “universal” jurisdiction for these kind of disputes
would be extremely controversial, a broader interpretation of
the notion of damage could help victims at least in certain situ-
ations.
2. Family and succession area
Outside the scope of civil and commercial matters, for
matters covered by the most recent EU regulations such as the
Regulations on Maintenance, Succession, Matrimonial Property
and Registered Partnership, the national jurisdictional rules that
were in force in single Member States have already been entirely
replaced by unified rules.
The question of unification (or harmonization) of the juris-
dictional grounds applicable in the relationship with third coun-
tries is still open with respect to the Brussels IIa Regulation. For
both matrimonial causes and parental responsibility, Articles 7
and 14 of that Regulation still refer to the national jurisdictional
rules in each Member State. As clarified by the ECJ48, and simi-
lar to the approach of more recent regulations, these provisions
are only applicable when no court in a Member State can assert
jurisdiction based on the primary jurisdictional grounds (listed in
Articles 3 to 5 for matrimonial causes and in Articles 8 to 12 for
parental responsibility). For the reasons mentioned above, this
reference to national rules should preferably be replaced by uni-
form jurisdictional grounds. However, the recent Recast Pro-
posal does not yet go in that direction49.
III. Lis pendens and related actions
Following the Recast, the Brussels Ia Regulation contains
provisions designed to cope with parallel proceedings pending be-
fore the courts of third countries (Articles 33 and 34). While
being a huge step forward towards a uniform approach, these rules
are still subject, to a certain extent, to the national law of the indi-
vidual Member States. As a matter of fact, since the rules on re-
cognition of third-country judgments are not unified, the “recog-
nition prognosis” (Anerkennungsprognose), which is required as a
condition for a procedural stay50, hinges on the national recogni-
tion rules in force in the forum State. It follows that the applica-
tion of the new European provisions may diverge from one
Member State to the other. As we will see, a simplification can
only be expected should EU law rules on the recognition and en-
forcement of third-country judgments be introduced.
Contrary to the Brussels Ia Regulation, the other European
PIL regulations do not include rules on lis pendens and related ac-
tions for “external” situations. Also it remains to be clarified
whether the Member States’ courts can still rely, in those areas,
on national lis pendens rules, if such rules exist51. Undoubtedly,
44 The ubiquity rule is undoubtedly applicable in product liability cases as
in all other tort disputes: ECJ, case C-189/08, Zuid-Chemie, [2009]
ECR I-6917; ECJ, case C-45/13, Kainz (published in the electronic
Report).
45 We refer to the well-known case law of the US Supreme Court: World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
46 ECJ, case C-69/93, Shevill, [1995] ECR I-415, para. 33.
47 ECJ, case 220/88, Dumez, [1990] ECR I-49; ECJ, case C-364/93, Mari-
nari, [1995] ECR I-2719.
48 ECJ, case C-68/07, Sundelind Lopez, [2007] ECR I-10403.
49 COM(2016) 411/2.
50 Under Articles 33 and 34, the court seized in a Member State may stay
the proceedings only if it is expected that the court in the third country
will give a judgment capable of recognition in the forum.
51 This might conflict with the Owusu ruling, where the ECJ held that
Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is “mandatory in nature”, with the
consequence that a court designated by the Brussels rules cannot decline
jurisdiction on national law grounds: ECJ, case C-281/02, Owusu,
[2005] ECR I-1383, No 37.While in that case the ECJ intended to rule
out the English forum non conveniens doctrine, it is open to discussion
whether the same arguments could be relied upon against national lis
pendens rules.
190 Bonomi: European Private International Law and Third States IPRax 2017, Heft 2
the inclusion of common European rules would represent im-
portant progress.
IV. Recognition and enforcement of
third-country judgments
None of the existing EU regulations include recognition and
enforcement rules applicable to third-country judgments. Up
until now, this issue is exclusively regulated by national recogni-
tion rules in force in each EU Member State, subject to existing
bilateral and multilateral conventions. The question to be
answered in the coming years is whether the development of
uniform European rules in this area is desirable. Assuming that
the answer is yes, we will then speculate on how such European
rules on recognition should be conceived.
1. On the desirability of unifying the rules on recognition and enforce-
ment of third-country judgments
The desirability of European recognition rules for the judg-
ments of third countries has not been discussed very often up
until now. The European Group of PIL thoroughly analysed the
question of uniform rules for third-country judgments in its Co-
penhagen and Brussels meetings and came up with a detailed
draft proposal52. However, as the commentary makes clear, the
Group intentionally avoided all discussion around the political
desirability of such unification and only focussed on its technical
modalities. Only few commentators have discussed the policy
issue53.
a) Priority of a treaty-based solution?
A first possible approach could be that the achievement of
uniformity on this issue should be left to an international treaty
to be negotiated under the auspices of the Hague Conference54.
As already mentioned, the Hague Judgments Project is heading
towards a convention on recognition and enforcement of foreign
decisions. If adopted and ratified by the EU, this instrument will
enter into force in all Member States as a part of the European
PIL system. The advantage of such an approach is that the treaty
rules will become applicable between the EU Member States
and the other Contracting States on the basis of reciprocity: they
will therefore not only allow the uniform recognition of third-
country decisions in the EU Member States but also, at the same
time, promote the recognition of EU Member States’ judgments
in third countries.
However, even though the adoption of a Hague instrument
will be a huge step forward, it will not solve all problems. First,
and obviously, this is because a treaty will only cover judgments
given in the Contracting States: subject to other treaties, judg-
ments from non-contracting States will continue to depend on
the national recognition rules of each Member State. Second,
the material scope of a future Hague Judgment Convention will
be limited only to some judgments in the civil and commercial
area: all judgments ruling on issues of family, succession, and
bankruptcy law will fall outside its scope, as well as those ruling
on some specifically excluded matters; accordingly, the 2016
Preliminary Draft rules out admiralty and defamation disputes55.
Here again, recognition and enforcement will be left to national
law. Finally, even for judgments covered by the future conven-
tion, national recognition rules will still play a role when they
allow for recognition in a particular case: as stated in Article 16
of the 2016 Preliminary Draft, the future convention will not
prevent the recognition and enforcement of judgments under
national law.
In all these cases, the national recognition rules of the indi-
vidual Member States will continue to be relevant. However,
such rules reflect different philosophies and traditions, and may
lead to quite diverging results. Such differences are much more
significant than those existing among US sister States. In the US,
in the absence of federal rules, recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments is also still a matter of State law; however, the
local rules are quite similar to each other because they are either
based on one of two Uniform Recognition Acts56, or they re-
flect shared common law principles based on comity57.
b) Arguments for a unilateral approach
The coexistence in Europe of divergent approaches to recog-
nition and enforcement of third-country judgments might be re-
garded as a situation one can live with. After all, the procedural
systems of the individual Member States are also very different
one from the other – if not in their basic philosophy, at least in
the technical details and in their efficacy. However, important ar-
guments also militate for the elaboration of common European
rules.
aa) Better protection of EU law objectives
A first line of arguments can be drawn from the consider-
ations that underpin the principle of mutual recognition of
Member States’ decisions and its corollaries, notably the uniform
European rules on jurisdiction and on applicable law. The
driving idea behind the spectacular rise of European PIL was the
unyielding belief of the European Commission and of the other
EU institutions that coexistence of diverging national rules in
these areas was inconsistent with both the European freedoms
and other EU basic principles, such as fair competition and the
creation of an area of liberty, security and justice. Arguably, the
same reasoning also applies to the recognition and enforcement
of third-country judgments58.
If money judgments stemming from third countries are easily
enforced in Member State A, but rejected in Member State B,
businesses having their seat and assets in B will enjoy an undue
advantage over competitors located in A. This might result in a
hurdle to the free movement of companies and capital, and even
lead eventually to the creation of “safe havens”, which are at
odds with free and fair competition. Mutatis mutandis, if third-
country judgments in family law matters (such as divorce, main-
tenance, property relations between spouses and partners, or pa-
rental responsibility) are recognised in Member State A and not
in Member State B, this may create “limping” relationships that
are hardly compatible with the establishment of a common area
52 “Extension of the 	Brussels I’ Regulation and judgments given in a State
which is not a Member of the European Union”, available at
http://www.gedip-egpil.eu/documents/gedip-documents-20poe.htm
(hereinafter: EGPIL Draft Proposal).
53 Carbone, What about the Recognition of Third States’ Foreign
Judgments?, in: Pocar/Viarengo/Villata (eds.), Recasting Brussels I,
2012, p. 299–309; Fallon/Kruger (fn. 19), p. 22 et seq.
54 This would mirror the solution preferred by the European Parliament
with respect to jurisdiction (see supra, fn. 7).
55 See Article 2(1)(g) and (k) of the 2016 Preliminary Draft.
56 The 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act and the
2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.
57 The common law principles on recognition have their historical roots in
the seminal decision Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
58 See also Fallon/Kruger (fn. 19), p. 23 (“[...] dysfunctioning of the Euro-
pean area that can result from disparities between national legislations”).
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of justice, and may eventually discourage the free movement of
persons inside the EU59.
Of course, this kind of arguments will probably not convince
everybody. As is well known, they have already been criticized
and resisted when they were advanced as a motive for the first
instruments in the area of judicial cooperation. This notwith-
standing, they finally led to the adoption of an impressive
number of EU regulations. That being so, there is no reason
why they should be taken less seriously now with respect to
third-country judgments.
bb) Consistency with the principles underlying existing regulations
A second group of arguments for the unification of the rec-
ognition rules throughout Europe is based on consistency with
the values underlying the choice-of-law rules included in most
European regulations. It can hardly be contested that the Euro-
pean conflict rules reflect a philosophy of both openness and
uniformity. First, all existing regulations include bilateral and
universal conflict rules, i.e. rules that allow for the application of
foreign law, including the law of a third country. By doing so,
they do not discriminate against the law of third countries, and
normally do not grant any priority to the law of the forum nor
of other EU Member States. Second, the European instruments
widely recognize party autonomy, allowing the choice of the ap-
plicable law even when it leads to the law of a third country.
Finally, while all regulations preserve the public policy of the
forum, they also require the court to use it in a very cautious
manner. All this reflects the concern of guaranteeing a uniform
regulation of cross-border relationships and avoiding “limping”
relationships. This approach is hardly consistent with a complete
indifference to the fate of third-country judgments, whose re-
cognition is also an essential ingredient of the international har-
mony of solutions.
cc) Smoothening the operation of existing regulations
Some more technical arguments in favour of unified rules for
the recognition and enforcement of third-country judgments
can finally also be derived from the need to improve and
smoothen the operation of existing regulations. As a matter of
fact, the recognition of third-country judgments significantly
impacts the functioning of certain European law rules.
On one hand, all existing rules on the recognition and en-
forcement of Member States’ judgments contemplate the incon-
sistency with and a third-country judgment as a ground for re-
fusal – this however obviously only if such judgment is capable
of recognition in the Member State addressed60. This condition
currently hinges on national recognition rules, which not only
makes the EU recognition provisions less predictable and more
difficult to apply, but also results in disparities as to the circu-
lation of a Member State’s judgment in the European area. Uni-
form recognition rules would remove this source of imbalance.
On the other hand, national recognition rules have also be-
come relevant for the functioning of European rules on lis
pendens and related actions. As already mentioned, Articles 33
and 34 of the Recast Regulation allow a Member State’s court
to stay proceedings when parallel suits have previously been
initiated abroad, but only if it is expected that the foreign court
will render a judgment capable of being recognised or enforced
in the forum country61. Currently, a court must verify this con-
dition on the basis of the national rules on recognition and en-
forcement. It follows, once again, that the operation of the uni-
form rules of Article 33 and 34 is less predictable and might lead
to different results in the individual Member States. Moreover, if
the court in Member State A refuses to stay proceedings on the
ground that the future third-country decision will not be recog-
nised in the forum, its judgment might then be denied recogni-
tion in Member State B if the third country’s decision is recog-
nised there.
dd) Avoiding the complexity of national recognition rules
Finally, the unification of the rules for recognition of third-
country judgments would also simplify the application of the
national recognition rules at least in certain Member States. In
most national recognition systems, the jurisdiction of the foreign
court (also known as “indirect jurisdiction”) is a standard
requirement for recognition. In several countries, this condition
hinges on the analogical application of the national rules on (“di-
rect”) jurisdiction in force in the State addressed (“bilateraliz-
ation”, “mirror effect”)62. Since the inclusion in many EU regu-
lations of uniform jurisdictional rules, which sometimes coexist
with, and sometimes replace, national jurisdictional rules, it re-
mains to be clarified if and how this affects indirect jurisdiction.
Is this condition still based on national jurisdictional rules (which
might have become inapplicable because of the European unifi-
cation), or should courts refer to the unified European rules, or
to both sets of rules63? The answer to this complex question
would become much easier if national recognition rules were re-
placed by common European rules.
2. How to proceed?
If the decision of introducing European rules on the recogni-
tion and enforcement of third-country judgments were taken,
the next question is how should these rules look. Obviously, this
question cannot be completely severed from the previous one,
since the opportunity to regulate a certain area is always affected
by the policy choices that might be included in the regulation in
question.
a) Relationship with other (existing or future) rules on recognition
A first question concerns the relationship of new European
rules with the existing recognition systems, i.e. the European
rules on the mutual recognition and enforcement of Member
States’ decisions, the rules included in a future Hague Judgments
Convention, and the national rules in the Member States.
The existing European rules on mutual recognition and en-
forcement are only applicable to decisions given in a Member
State. They are based on reciprocity and mutual trust among the
Member States. While such rules can certainly provide a frame-
work for European rules on third-country judgments, it is clear
that there is no need for a complete alignment64.
59 Fallon/Kruger (fn. 19), p. 23 (fn. 81).
60 See Article 45(1)(d) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Similar rules are pro-
vided for in all of the other regulations that deal with the recognition
and enforcement of Member States’ decisions.
61 See supra, fn. 50.
62 See, for instance, Article 328(1)(1) of the German ZPO (“Spiegelbildprin-
zip“), Article 64(a) of the Italian PIL Act, and Article 14 of the Belgian
PIL Code.
63 Bonomi, R
gles europennes de competence et r
gles nationales de
reconnaissance: une cohabitation difficile, in: Entre Bruselas e La Haya.
Liber Amicorum Alegra Borrs, 2013, p. 241–254.
64 See the commentary by Fallon to the EGPIL Draft Proposal (supra,
fn. 52): “Globalement, le regime appliqu aux dcisions de pays tiers ne
devrait pas diffrer fondamentalement de celui appliqu actuellement aux
dcision des Etats membres”; however, “[...] l’analogie des regimes ne
signifie pas l’identit des regimes”. See also Fallon/Kruger (fn. 19), p. 33.
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The same is also true with respect to the rules on recognition
and enforcement that might be included in a future Hague Con-
vention. If the European unilateral rules were exactly equivalent
to those of such a conventional instrument, there would be no
incentive for a third country to negotiate and ratify that conven-
tion. This does not mean that – at least on specific points – the
European rules cannot be similar to, or even more favourable to
recognition than those of a global treaty: as mentioned above,
the Hague Convention will almost certainly allow for the ap-
plication of more favourable (national or supranational) rules65.
However, this cannot be true for every single European rule.
Finally, the national recognition rules of the Member States
will be replaced by a European regulation. Their concurrent ap-
plication based on the principle of favor recognitionis is difficult to
envisage, because it would jeopardise the improvements that are
expected from the adoption of uniform rules. Of course, these
rules can also be a source of inspiration – as they already were
when the existing EU-law rules on recognition and enforcement
were first adopted. However, because of their diversity, the
drafters of a European regulation will have to arrive at clear
choices from the different available options or come up with
original solutions.
b) Content of the uniform recognition rules
aa) General principles on recognition and enforcement
It seems quite obvious that some basic features of the existing
European rules on mutual recognition and enforcement should
also be extended to the recognition and enforcement of third-
country judgments. The fact that some of these points have also
been included in the 2016 Hague Preliminary Draft is a reflec-
tion of this.
This is notably true for several general principles on recogni-
tion and enforcement, such as “Wirkungserstreckung”66 or the
prohibition of revision of the foreign judgment on the merits67.
However, it is debatable whether third-country judgments
should also benefit from the principle of “automatic” recogni-
tion (“without any special procedure being required”). Cer-
tainly, there is no need for abolishing exequatur proceedings, as
has already taken place in the Recast Regulation and in a
number of other EU instruments68.
bb) Grounds for denial
The essential grounds for denial under the existing EU regu-
lations should obviously also be applicable with respect to third-
country judgments. These include a manifest incompatibility
with public policy, insufficient notice of process, and inconsist-
ency with a judgment given between the same parties, either in
the requested State or in a third country69. The 2016 Hague
Preliminary Draft is very similar to the EU regulations also in
this respect70.
However, some deviation from the existing EU rules are
probably needed.
First, the notion of “insufficient notice” would probably
need to be adapted. As is well known, since the Brussels I Regu-
lation, existing EU rules on recognition have no longer focussed
on the “regularity” of service, but rather on the question of
whether the defendant was placed in a position to arrange its de-
fence. This is justified by the need to prevent abuses, but also by
the fact that the judgments covered by these instruments orig-
inate from Member States bound by the EU Service Regu-
lation71. Since third countries are not bound by that instrument,
it is important to ensure that service of process is made in a regu-
lar way, or at least in line with the basic European principles con-
cerning service of process72.
Second, a specific ground of denial based on lis pendens
should probably be added. In a number of internal and inter-
national systems, recognition of a foreign judgment can be ref-
used when proceedings between the same parties and on the
same object are already pending in the State addressed, provided
that they had been initiated before the foreign proceedings73.
This ground for refusal would be extremely valuable with respect
to third countries, in particular because many of those countries
do not have mandatory lis pendens rules akin to those of the EU
regulations74.
Thirdly, considering the very strict interpretation of the pub-
lic policy exception by the ECJ75, it would be wise to provide
for an additional ground of refusal based on the inobservance of
overriding mandatory provisions within the meaning of
Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation. This should cover both
overriding provisions that are part of the law of the forum and
those belonging to European law76.
Finally, the inclusion of specific provisions could be con-
sidered for situations of “systemic” lack of due process and mis-
carriage of justice in the foreign country77. In the national re-
cognition systems these situations fall normally under the public
policy exception. However, since courts are generally very reluc-
tant to invoke public policy, it might be wise to include in a fu-
ture EU regulation a sort of “safeguard clause” allowing the
European Commission to “suspend” its application in relation to
those countries that do not guarantee an impartial judicial system
and the observance of the rule of law.
cc) Recognition bases (“indirect” jurisdiction)
Contrary to the regulations on mutual recognition of
Member States’ judgments, a future instrument on the decisions
of third countries should include some “jurisdictional filters”,
i.e. some requirements as to the “indirect” jurisdiction of the
foreign court78. Given that jurisdictional rules are not harmon-
ized outside the EU, the risk exists that a third-country judg-
ment might be given on unreasonable or exorbitant jurisdic-
tional grounds.
How should the rules of indirect jurisdiction be conceived?
In theory, one could envisage three different approaches (which
65 See Article 16 of the 2016 Preliminary Draft.
66 ECJ, case 145/86, [1988] ECR 645, No 11. See also Article 14, first sen-
tence, of the 2016 Hague Preliminary Draft.
67 Article 52 of the Brussels Ia Regulation (and the identical provisions
included in all of the other existing regulations). See also Article 4(2) of
the 2016 Hague Preliminary Draft.
68 See Article 56-8 and 56-9 of the EGPIL Draft Proposal.
69 Article 45(1)(b) to (d) of the Brussels Ia Regulation (and the similar pro-
visions included in all of the other existing regulations).
70 See Article 7(1)(a), (c), (e) and (f) of the 2016 Preliminary Draft.
71 Regulation No 1393/2007.
72 See Article 9(c) of the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention and
Article 7(1)(a) of the 2016 Hague Preliminary Draft.
73 See for instance Article 27(2)(c) of the Swiss PIL Act, Article 64(1)(f) of
the Italian PIL Act, and Article 22(c) of the 2007 Hague Child Support
Convention. See also Article 7(2) of the 2016 Hague Preliminary Draft.
74 See Article 56-4(2) of the EGPIL Draft Proposal.
75 ECJ, case C-7/98, Krombach, [2000] ECR I-1935, No 21 and 37; ECJ,
case C-394/07, Gambazzi, [2009], I-2563, No 27; ECJ, case C-559/14,
Meroni (not yet published), No 42.
76 See Article 56-5(1) of the EGPIL Draft Proposal.
77 This situation is specifically contemplated as a mandatory ground of
denial by both the 1962 and 2005 US Uniform Recognition Acts: see
§ 4(A)(1) of the 1962 Act; § 4(b)(1) of the 2005 Act.
78 See also Article 56-3 of the EGPIL Draft Proposal.
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of course could also be combined depending on the subject
matter).
Under a first approach, the recognition bases would simply
mirror the rules of direct jurisdiction. This approach is currently
adopted in several EU Member States79. Its advantage is that –
blurring the distinction between direct and indirect jurisdiction
– it makes it unnecessary to include specific recognition bases.
The downside is that far-reaching jurisdictional rules – such as
those we have proposed above – automatically result in a broad
recognition system, an outcome that is not necessarily desirable.
In particular, the risk exists that an excessive openness puts in
jeopardy the chances of success of a future Hague instrument80.
Instead of spelling out specific rules on indirect jurisdiction,
the EU regulation could simply require the existence of a “sub-
stantial connection” between the dispute and the foreign court,
leaving to the judiciary the task of applying such an open test in
each particular case81. This second approach, followed by the
French courts since the Simitch case82, also resembles the US juris-
dictional analysis, based on “minimum contacts” and “purposeful
availment”. While avoiding recognition of judgments given on
unreasonable or exorbitant jurisdictional grounds, this system is
even more liberal than the “mirror image” test. For the reason we
have already mentioned, this probably goes too far. Moreover, this
system risks being quite unpredictable and may result in divergent
applications across the individual Member States.
All things considered, the best solution would probably be to
spell out some specific recognition bases. These should probably
be narrower than the direct jurisdictional grounds made available
in third country situations and closer to the kind of grounds that
are presently provided for claims against European defendants.
V. Concluding Remarks
Articulated in a number of sectorial regulations, the Euro-
pean private international law system has not always grown in a
very systematic way. After years of swift development towards a
more extensive coverage of different civil law areas and an in-
creased integration of the national systems, the time has probably
come to improve the coordination among the single instru-
ments.
The regulation of third-country relationships is undoubtedly
one of those issues that call for a more consistent approach.
While the universal application of choice-of-law rules is a
constant feature of all adopted regulations, unjustified disparities
persist with respect to jurisdiction and lis pendens. The national
rules of the Member States have been entirely replaced by uni-
form European rules in certain areas, whereas they are still very
relevant in others. Parallel proceedings pending in a third
country are dealt with under one regulation, but ignored by the
others. And while the recognition and enforcement of third-
country judgments is consistently left to national law, this might
seem at odds with the far-reaching European coverage of juris-
diction and choice-of-law issues.
Hopefully, the Hague Judgments Project will result in a suc-
cessful convention in the near future. But the external relations
of the EU in the area of private international law should not de-
pend entirely on the prospects for a Hague instrument. Whether
this prospect materializes or not, the EU institutions should take
advantage of the negotiation process in order to elaborate on a
coherent set of unilateral European law rules for disputes invol-
ving parties of third countries.
Diskussionsbericht zu den Referaten von Jayme und Bonomi
In der von Prof. Dr. Karsten Thorn, Hamburg, geleiteten
Diskussion knpfte Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Jrgen Basedow,
Hamburg, an die von Jayme berichtete Gutachtenanfrage zum
spanischen Ehescheidungsrecht und die Bedeutung von Art. 13
Abs. 3 EGBGB an. Nach Auffassung Basedows muss sich die Vor-
schrift an der europischen Freizgigkeit messen lassen. Mçgli-
cherweise gebe das Primrrecht insoweit vor, die Ehe eines Uni-
onsbrgers, die in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat als wirksam gelte,
ohne weitere Voraussetzungen auch vom deutschen Recht als
wirksam anzuerkennen. Basedow zog hier eine Parallele zur Ent-
scheidung Grunkin-Paul des EuGH,1 nach der Art. 18 EG (heute
Art. 21 AEUV) das Standesamt eines Mitgliedstaats zwinge, den
Nachnamen eines auslndischen Staatsbrgers anzuerkennen,
der in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat bestimmt und eingetragen
wurde. Jayme wies auf eine Konsequenz dieser Sichtweise hin:
Auch rein religiçs geschlossene Ehen mssten vor den deutschen
Gerichten uneingeschrnkt Anerkennung finden.
Basedow thematisierte ferner die von Bonomi aufgeworfene
universelle Zustndigkeit bei Menschenrechtsverletzungen. Hier
stelle sich das Problem, dass die Gerichte bereits auf der Zustn-
digkeitsebene die unter Umstnden auch politisch heikle Frage
umfassend prfen mssten, ob tatschlich eine Menschenrechts-
verletzung vorliegt. Hierzu schlug Prof. Dr. Gerald Msch,
Mnster, vor, die Lehre von den doppelrelevanten Tatsachen he-
ranzuziehen: Fr die Begrndung der Zustndigkeit reiche es
demnach aus, wenn die Menschenrechtsverletzung schlssig vor-
getragen sei. Basedow erwiderte, dass in den etablierten Fallgrup-
pen der Lehre von den doppelrelevanten Tatsachen stets eine
(zumindest potentielle) çrtliche Verbindung zum Forum beste-
he, whrend es bei der universellen Zustndigkeit an einem sol-
chen lokalen Bezug gerade fehle.
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Thomas Pfeiffer, Heidelberg, nahm Bezug
auf den „Heidelberg-Report“ von 20072 und die dort fest-
gestellten Auswirkungen divergierender nationaler Zustndig-
keitsvorschriften. Auslndische Klger kçnnten sich ohne wei-
teres auf § 23 ZPO berufen, wenn der Beklagte mit Wohnsitz in
79 See supra, fn. 62.
80 The recognition bases included in Article 5 of the 2016 Hague Prelimi-
nary Draft are quite restrictive: see Bonomi (fn. 16), p. 30 et seq.
81 This approach was adopted by the EGPIL in Article 56-3(3) of its Draft
Proposal. However, this provision also includes a “black list” of prohibi-
ted grounds in line with Article 18 of the 1999 Hague Draft Convention
(supra, fn. 20).
82 Cass. civ. 6.2.1985, Simitch, RCDIP 1985, p. 369; Bureau/Muir Watt,
Droit international priv I, 2007, No 264 et seq.
1 EuGH, Urteil v. 14.10.2008 – Rs. C-353/06 – Grunkin-Paul = NJW
2009, 135.
2 Hess/Pfeiffer/Schlosser, The Brussels I Regulation 44/2001: Application
and Enforcement in the EU, 2008; auch online verfgbar.
